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The paper investigates the problem of possibility of investment allocation by 
economies according to adverse pattern, which can ultimately imply the rise of 
situation of market failure. We consider the transformation of “ideal” capital 
allocation into allocation of adverse-selection-type, which occurs as a result of 
migration of agents of different types. We conclude that the uncontrolled agents’ 
behavior, due to their bounded rationality, can lead to adverse selection state, when 
the less effective agents are investors in economies with most favorable investment 
climate, and vice versa. 
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 Introduction 
The present paper considers the possibility of existence of non-effective capital 
allocation in conditions of rational and bounded rational behavior of agents. The 
problem is that the bounded rational behavior can lead to investment allocation 
according the adverse selection pattern, which ultimately implies the rise of situation 
of market failure. The additional problem is that the government nonintervention is 
entirely possible, in spite of obvious expedience of such intervention. Hereafter, we 
will try to uncover the reasons of mentioned agents’ behavior and conditions of 
appearance of mentioned situations; henceforth it can facilitate the incentive of 
government intervention in economy aiming to prevent the market failure and to 
improve its efficiency. 
Literature Review 
In economic theory the various aspects of adverse selection problem of is 
discussed over time. Akerlof (1970) first considered the genesis of adverse selection. 
D’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979), studying the optimal public design 
mechanisms, for the first time used the linear inequality methods to handle adverse 
selection. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that in equilibrium a loan market may be 
characterized by credit rationing. According to them the interest rate a bank charges 
may itself affect the riskiness of the pool of loans by sorting potential borrowers (the 
adverse selection effect) or affecting the actions of borrowers (the incentive effect). 
Both effects are caused by imperfect information in loan markets. Different 
borrowers have different probabilities of repaying their loan. This leads to adverse 
selection aspect of interest rates. Boyd and Smith (1993) considered credit rationing 
in an environment with adverse selection. They studied the equilibrium allocation of 
investment capital in an environment with some features, concerning the investment 
activity. Philippony and Skretaz (2012) study the design of interventions to stabilize 
financial markets plagued by adverse selection. They have shown that the efficiency 
of an intervention can be assessed by its impact on the market interest rate. The 
presence of an outside market determines the nature of optimal interventions and the 
choice of financial instruments, but it does not affect implementation costs. 
There is a line of research concerning the modeling of adverse selection in 
entrepreneurship (Huberman and Kandel (1993), Heinkel and Stoughton (1994), 
Martin (2009)). Huberman and Kandel (1993) consider the two-asset signaling model 
(with elements of adverse selection) of money managers. As a result, they find that 
the asset allocation strategy of low and high quality managers can be distorted by 
reason of different portfolio weights, which may be considered as a signal of the 
managers’ ability. Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) consider the two-period relationship 
between a client and a portfolio manager and the resulting problem o f motivating a 
manager of unknown ability to acquire valuable information. In their model they 
consider the situation with both adverse selection and moral hazard. They conclude 
that the possibility of multiple periods can enhance portfolio management 
performance in the initial stages of a client-manager relationship and work to the 
mutual benefit of both agents. Martin (2009) considered the relationship between 
entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection, 
concentration on pooling and separating equilibria. 
More specifically, the adverse selection as consequence of incomplete 
information have been discussed in Besley (1994), Tirole (2006, 2011), Kirabaeva 
(2011). Besley (1994) studied market failure, emphasizing the need to consider the 
full array of constraints that combine to make a market work imperfectly. He 
discussed various reasons for market failure and considered the problems that may be 
cited as failures of the market justifying intervention (enforcement; imperfect 
information, especially adverse selection and moral hazard; the risk of bank runs and 
so on). Besley (1994) concluded that there may be good arguments for intervention, 
and some may be based on market failure. Tirole (2006) in his “Theory of Corporate 
Finance” introduced asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders at the 
financing stage. The presented models are based on model of adverse selection in 
capital allocation and on model of moral hazard in capital allocation. Tirole (2006) 
defined some limitation of model: absence of asymmetric information about 
investors; absence of informational advantages over issuers for investors and so on. 
Investors are naturally concerned by the prospect of buying into a firm with 
poor prospects. Such adverse selection in general makes it more difficult for insiders 
to raise funds. Kirabaeva (2011) studied financial crises in emerging markets. She 
concluded that asymmetric information between domestic investors (borrowers) and 
foreign investors (lenders) can lead to adverse-selection problems in a country that 
finances its domestic investment and consumption through foreign debt or foreign 
equity. Tirole (2011) provided analysis of market jumpstarting and its two-way 
interaction between mechanism design and participation constraints. He fined that the 
government can reduce adverse selection enough to let the market rebound, but not 
too much, so as to limit the cost of intervention. 
Capital Allocation Model 
The functioning of group of the bounded economies can be analyzed in the 
context of their association on the one side and of some single economy inside this 
group – from another side. The efficient economic activity in mentioned cases bases 
on different criteria: while we consider the efficiency as the welfare maximization, 
but in the first instance it is aggregate welfare of all economies, and in the latter case 
it is welfare of a single economy. 
Here the problem of optimization of capital allocation is to find the optimal 
allocation of economic agents by jurisdictions, i.e. to find allocation, which 
maximizes welfare both of all economies and a single one. 
To analyze the mentioned problem we developed a formal model of capital 
allocation, considering the interaction between economic agents in the system of 
capital employment, which describes the investment and its returns, received by 
investors. 
Two types of agents can be distinguished in the system of investment activity: 
investors and government; the last establishes rules for “the game”, determines the 
tax level, collects taxes and, perhaps, spends some collected revenues on improving 
of investment climate. 
It can be kindly assumed that the revenue of i-th investor in the economy ri 
depends on 
amount of capital employment, invested by him in economy; 
efficiency of application of these funds, i.e. the acquisition other things equal 
of maximum return per unit of investment; 
investment climate in economy. 
The parameter of “investor’s efficiency” illustrates how efficiently the 
investors other things equal are capable to invest, i.e. their investment skills. It is 
obvious that there is no procedure to its direct measurement both for the group of 
agents and the separate ones. In applications only the indirect estimation of 
mentioned parameter is possible. 
The parameter of “investment climate’s efficiency”, as well as the previous 
one, can be estimated only indirectly, by expertise. It demonstrates, how easy (and, 
therefore, efficiently) one can carry on investment activity in some economy. The 
size of this parameter depends on legislation transparency, level of risks, corruption, 
economic and financial development and so on. The amount of transaction costs in 
some economy can be regarded to some extent as the estimation of efficiency of 
investment climate (although this amount also is difficult to be estimated). 
We should note that the mentioned factors someway are ephemeral. 
Simultaneously, their impact on investment profitability is sufficiently obvious. 
Comparing these factors, we can observe that the investor’s efficiency 
characterizes the competency of economic agents (of only in aggregated form), 
whereas the efficiency of investment climate refers to parameters of function of 
economic system. 
It is not easy for investor to improve its investment skills, but he can quickly 
change the amount of invested capital. The change of investment climate also is long-
time process, so let’s consider hereafter the amount of invested capital as controlled 
parameter, and investment efficiency and favorability of investment climate as 
uncontrolled parameters – the environment parameters. 
Hence, the capital allocation model operates the following parameters, 
appropriate to investors: 
amount of investment; 
characteristics of investors’ efficiency 
and the parameter, appropriate to government – 
characteristics of investment climate. 








 is the set of economies; 
xi(t) is the investment of i-th investor at time t; 
yj(t) is the investment of i-th investor destined for improving its skills at time t; 
zi(t) is the investment of i-th investor destined for improving the investment 
climate in economy at time t; 
; ;i i ix t y t z t  is the allocation of investment of i-th investor at time t, 
besides 





 is the active capital of i-th investor at time t: 
1i i iU t U t x t ; 
, ; , , ,i i i i j jr t r x t a b  is the revenue of i-th investor proceeded from its 
investment at time t, besides ai and αi characterize the investor’s skills, and bj 
and βj characterize the investment climate of j-th economy, moreover 
: 1, , : 1, : 0, 0, 0, 0i j i ji i N j j N a b . 
Function of investment yield for i-th agent on its qualification, and also on 
investment climate of j-th economy, conceptually can take various forms, but it 
should correspond to principle of interdependence of mentioned parameters. Notably, 
the behavior of S-shape function (for example, the logistic function – the Pearl-Read 
function, the Gompertz function etc.) and of exponential function corresponds to this 
principle. We get for exponential: 
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x
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and for S-shape function: 
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e
. 
Besides, the agents differ by their cognitive abilities; in the context of our study 
it means that there are two groups of agents: “maximizers”, aiming to maximize their 
own profit , ; , , , maxi i i j jr x t a b , and “satisfiers” (see, for example, the 
Simon’s definition of “satisfiers” in (Simon, (1955)), who are satisfied by getting a 
profit , ; , , , 0i i i j jr x t a b . 
“Ideal” capital allocation 
Let us consider preliminarily the optimal allocation in ideal conditions. It can 
be shown that in this case the allocation, when the most effective agents act inside of 
economies with the most congenial climate; the most effective agents among the 
remainders act inside of economies etc., will be an optimal allocation of agents’ 
equity (Sokolovskyi and Luk’yanenko (2011)). 
Assume that exactly one investor can act in a single economy. Then for any 
two investors (i1, i2) and any two economies (j1, j2), for which the following 
conditions 
1 1 1 2 2 2
, ; , , , , ; , , ,i i i j j i i i j jr x t a b r x t a b ; 
1 1 2 2
, ; , , , , ; , , ,i i i j j i i i j jr x t a b r x t a b  
hold, the proposition 
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i i i j j i i i j j
r x t a b r x t a b
r x t a b r x t a b
  (3) 
holds. 
Obviously, it is equally true for any number of economies and of investors. I.e., 
the optimal allocation (in terms of efficiency) will be the following: in the most 
favorable economic environment the most efficient agents act individually and their 
number is necessary and sufficient to satiate the investment demand inside of given 
economy. The most effective agents among the remainders act in the less favorable 
environment etc. The least favorable environment remains for least effective 













Figure 1. Optimal allocation of investors in economies 
Formally it can be written by considering the decision-making (behavior) of 
investors, depend upon the parameters of economic environment, in which the 
investors act. Assume for i=1,2,…n: 
Xi is the amount of investment assets of agents, acting in different economies; 
Yi is the market potential of each economy; 
(i) is the function of distribution of investment assets, belonging to agents of i-th 
economy: 
: 1,2, , : 1,2, ,i i M i n  ; 
(i) is the function of ordering the agents, possessing the following properties: 
assume that 
1 1 2 2




: 1,2, , : 1,2, ,i i M i M  . 
It is obvious that 
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Then, the following allocation will be the most effective: 
1 1
1 1: 1; 2, , : : j ji i i j M i i i i j . (2) 
Adverse selection as a result of agents’ migration 
It should be noted that we used the model to estimate the following: 
the favorable conditions for agents of different groups for shifting into the 
economy with better investment climate; 
the agents’ attitude towards appearance in economy of another agents’; 
the agents’ will to invest into improvement of economic environment in which 
they act; 
the government’s will to invest into improvement of national economy. 
Despite the fact that in classical case of homo oeconomicus all “maximizers” 
seek to act in the economy with most favorable investment climate, the presence of 
competition in absence of entry/exit barriers in the non-tax world leads to 
displacement of less effective investors by more effective ones in worst economic 
environment. 
More strictly this means that if at time t the agents i1 and i2 fight for place in j-
th economy, besides 
1 1 2 2
, , , , , , , , , ,i i j j i i j jr x t a b r x t a b , then agent i1 wins 
and agent i2 is displaced to less effective economy (with index j+1, j+2 …). 
As a consequence of that process, some time it can be observed the effective 
allocation of agents by economies, illustrated on Fig. 1. 
I.e., agreeing with (2) in some economy there will be “maximizers”, whose 
skills are insufficient to act in more effective economy. 
From that point of view it is obvious, that their current position is optimal for 
them. This implies that “maximizers” will not seek either to pass into the more 
effective economy, or to improve the investment climate of economy, in which they 
act (“maximizers” fear, that in this situation they will be displaced by more efficient 
investors). In other words, for “maximizers” the allocation (2) is equilibrium. This 
implies that they have no sustainable incentives for migration. 
As for “satisfiers” it should be noted that when the condition 
, ; , , , 0i i i j jr x t a b  holds (this means, that their activity in some economy is 
profitable), “satisfiers” will do nothing to improve the favorability of investment 
climate, since they are satisfies by their current position. When the “satisfiers” skills 
are insufficient to provide the profitable activity in given economy, they will seek to 
leave this economy and enter to the one with more favorable investment climate, 
which will allow them to gain a profit. It is clear that such seeking looks like “despair 
gesture”, since in ideal static conditions of perfect market, they had to bankrupt. But 
indeed the new markets appear and the entry barriers can thwart certain effective 
investors, therefore an opportunity to achieve a success arises for ineffective ones 
(Fig. 2). 
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Figure. 2. Tendencies of agents’ migration 
The logical analysis allows confirming the following. 
In certain economies the investors-satisfiers aim to be sufficiently effective and 
do not become a bankrupt, because they are completely satisfied by their current 
position. Coincidently the less effective investors, primarily, will try to change the 
less effective economies on more effective ones, and after them the effective 
investors-maximizers will try to do so. 
Entering of additional investors into economy can lead to deterioration of 
investment climate (due to glut of economy by equity) and also to strengthening of 
competition between new agents and existing ones. Thus it is obvious that the 
rationally acting existing agents will resist to appearance of new ones, moreover, the 
more the new agents are effective, the stronger will be the resistance, because their 
appearance will create the stronger competition. As a consequence, the tendencies of 
agents’ migration lead to the case, contrary to situation, illustrated on Fig. 1: the less 
effective investors are in the economy with more favorable climate, and their “seats” 
in less favorable economy are occupied by most effective ones. 
This implies that the average efficiency of economy will decrease with time 
rather than increase; that correspond to standard case of “adverse selection” (Akerlof 
(1980)) (Fig. 3). 
 











Figure 3. Investors allocation in economies according 
to adverse selection principle 
Finally it reasonable to consider that it can lead to “closure” of economy and to 
the appearance of incomplete market as a form of market failure (Bator (1958), 
Stiglitz (1989)). 
Certainly, the described situation is the reason for government intervention, 
which can consist both in the administrative control of agents’ migration, setting of 
entry/exit barriers and in the economic measures (to our mind this is more 
interesting), in particular, in the investment into improving the investment climate of 
economy. 
At that the government can both to involve the own public finance, to borrow 
the capital in financial markets and to incite the agents by some means for investment 
into improving the investment climate. 
Conclusion 
The analysis of model of investment allocation by economies allows 
concluding that the free (uncontrolled) agents’ behavior [under certain conditions], 
due to their bounded rationality, can lead to adverse selection state, when the less 
effective agents are investors in economies with most favorable investment climate, 
and vice versa. 
The government administrative and/or economic intervention aimed both to 
non-admittance of ineffective investors and to improving of investment climate of 
appropriate economies, can be the way out. 
The analysis of government’s and investors’ behavior within the frame of 
given issue is beyond the scope of present article; however it is in the scope of 
authors’ research. 
Thus, further it is assumed to analyze the conditions, necessary for appearance 
(and disappearance) of incentives to invest into improving of investment climate. It is 
subject to both government and agents of different type: effective and ineffective 
“maximizers” and “satisfiers”. The similar models for production and insurance 
spheres were proposed in Sokolovskiy (2001, 2011). 
Further formalization of mentioned behavioral and estimative characteristics 
and also the effectiveness parameters will allow forecasting the appearance of hazard 
in such situation in real economy, and, therefore, will allow preventing the similar 
situation. 
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